criminal risks and Russia’s strikes on civilians

While we focus on the immediate goal — Ukraine’s victory in this war and the role drones can play in achieving it — criminals, terrorists, and other malicious actors worldwide are observing and taking notes. I have raised this issue several times in my newsletter: states must not only learn and acquire unmanned systems, but also implement robust counter-UAS measures. Because nothing will easily stop criminal groups from adopting these innovations and exporting violence into civilian life.

In the context of the war in Ukraine, multiple independent reports confirm that Russian forces are using unmanned technologies to target civilians — acts that amount to nothing less than war crimes.

In this edition:

• Crime by Drone: a New Paradigm for Organized Crime (report by GI-TOC);

• “Digital warfare” — a New Reality: Russian Perspective;

• How Ukraine is Developing “Middlestrike” Drones;

• 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

After an almost one-month break, I’m slowly returning to a more regular release schedule for Drone Warfare in Ukraine.

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Crime by Drone: a New Paradigm for Organized Crime (report by GI-TOC)

Drones are our new reality, and it’s time to take them seriously.

This report by Paddy Ginn and Alex Goodwin from the Global Initiative Against Transorganized Crime (GI-TOC) demonstrates that states must be fully prepared for the use of drones by criminals, terrorists, and other security disruptors. Such preparedness requires not only robust regulatory frameworks but also the development of counter-drone capabilities and skilled personnel capable of operating them effectively.

Even if a particular country does not face a direct armed conflict and does not want to get involved in a global drone race, it should still be closely familiar with these technologies and invest in counter-UAS solutions.

At the heart of the research is an exercise conducted with Ukrainian drone pilots, which aimed to understand the potential crossover of drone technology into organized crime within the land, air, and sea domains.

The authors demonstrate that the use of drones requires a suite of skills and considerations that could represent points of disruption for law enforcement and policymakers. The risk should not be underestimated.

Here is my summary of the report:

• Drones are being adopted for criminal purposes: smuggling, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and worse. The trend is towards criminal gangs using them with greater scale and sophistication.

• The Russo-Ukrainian war has led to technological advances in drone capabilities, which organized crime groups are adopting. We may be witnessing the prodromal signs of an underworld paradigm shift.

• The resulting breakthroughs rarely remain confined to the battlefield; once the conflict ends, these innovations diffuse into wider society, reshaping economies, daily life, and even cultural expectations.

• Criminal gangs have moved quickly to exploit the accessibility and adaptability of drone technology.

• These developments have enabled them to reduce personnel risk, innovate across domains (air, land, and sea), and bypass traditional patrol and surveillance regimes. Their methods range from small quadcopters carrying heroin or methamphetamine to adapted industrial UAVs and autonomous underwater vehicles designed for the bulk transport of drugs.

• In the air, for example, drones enable surveillance, delivery and targeted violence.

• On land, they facilitate the movement of goods and reconnaissance.

• The sea domain offers opportunities for large-scale smuggling and transnational logistics, with drones and digital networks increasingly being layered onto maritime trafficking.

• The integration of drones and humans, and the convergence of physical and digital methods, produce a flexible and resilient criminal system that is increasingly difficult to counter with conventional law enforcement tools.

• The unmanned systems, however, have their limitations.

• Aerial platforms have been used for high-profit smuggling and assassinations. However, precision strikes demand detailed reconnaissance, skilled pilots and/or AI-enabled targeting. Consequently, criminal gangs still employ hitmen, but drone assassinations could be used for hard-to-reach targets

• Although land drones can carry heavy payloads in smuggling operations, they have a limited range and are unable to navigate rough terrain. As they use line-of-sight signal communications, they also require a chain of repeaters at regular intervals, which complicates their use for criminal activities. However, an armed land drone could provide a powerful element of terror in urban environments, an alarming prospect for public security, worth illustrating. Armed land drones could effectively act as foot soldiers for organized crime groups, pushing out competitors and claiming territory in street battles.

• Maritime drones are a long-range, high-capacity option well suited to the trafficking of drugs or even arms, and may also have potential as offensive weapons in maritime piracy. Although they have more limited distance capabilities, they are more robust and technologically advanced than the narco-submarines previously employed for these activities. However, due to their high cost and the challenges of operating at sea, they are likely to be accessible only to the most sophisticated criminal groups operating in lucrative illicit markets, such as the cocaine trade.

  The prospect of criminal control may also make sea drones an attractive option for arms trafficking, particularly if the craft could ferry illicit commodities back on the return journey. With a payload of 650 kilograms, a drone could carry 100 AK-47s with magazines or the same number of 72 mm RPG-32s – a serious proposition, and one that may be appealing to some of organized crime’s customers, such as terrorists and non-state actors.

• Future responses to the criminal use of drones will need to combine ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ approaches within an integrated ecosystem of technology, regulation, and forensics.

• On the soft side, electronic warfare tools such as jamming, signal seizure and directed-energy weapons can be used to suppress hostile unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), supported by next-generation detection technologies such as AI-enhanced radar, as well as acoustic, optical and radio-frequency monitoring systems.

• Hard countermeasures focus on physically destroying drones using anti-aircraft weapons, interceptor drones, lasers and microwave systems. Passive protection measures like geofencing, nets, false walls and specialized hangars could provide an additional defensive layer for critical sites.

• Regulatory frameworks such as flight restrictions, identification schemes and interagency coordination mechanisms will help to shape the threat landscape, with concepts like ‘urban anti-drone domes’ offering metropolitan-scale protection.

• Forensics plays a vital accountability role by enabling investigators to trace captured or destroyed drones back to their operators through serial numbers, GPS data, communication packets or firmware. However, this process is often hindered by damage, encryption or deliberate erasure.

• Consultations with drone operators in Ukraine reveal that human expertise remains at the heart of the capability and a vital point of intervention. Engineers, workshop operators, parts suppliers and firmware modifiers are all vital for scaling up the use of drones. Unmanned systems also rely on skilled technical networks, particularly pilots. Couriers, spotters and coordinators play a critical role in marking drop zones and retrieving payloads.

I would like to add that the large number of skilled personnel capable of operating and maintaining unmanned systems—resulting from the Russian-Ukrainian war—will create an additional layer of complications after the active phase of the conflict. According to recent data, Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces aim to expand their staffing to 5% of the Armed Forces, or roughly 30,000-45,000 personnel.

Russia plans to train more than 1 million specialists for the drone industry by 2030. “This effort already involves 42,800 schools and vocational education institutions, as well as 70 higher education institutions,” the Russian authority said.

In Russia’s case, its involvement in distant regions raises concerns that experienced drone operators returning from Ukraine, if left without employment at home, may seek to apply their skills elsewhere, in areas where Russian troops or paramilitary organizations are active.

Read my summary of the previous GI-TOC report: Future trends in arms trafficking from the Ukraine conflict.

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“Digital Warfare” — a New Reality: Russian Perspective

I rarely summarize Russian sources, but this article was shared with me by a contact of mine in Ukraine’s defence forces, and it deserves attention.

(The only other summary of an interview with a Russian expert can be found here: American drones turned out to be junk”: interview with the Russian drone producer.)

Read my summary below.