Drone warfare in Ukraine: interceptors, data, and new MoD initiatives

Ukraine’s drone warfare is moving by leaps and bounds toward digitalization. Ukraine’s new Defence Minister started strong, announcing the launch of a project to train and test AI models using real-world battlefield data to detect and intercept aerial threats, and introducing Mission Control, a comprehensive drone management system within the DELTA.

Zelensky assessed the current performance of Ukraine’s defence forces in countering Shahed-type threats as insufficient, and clearly defined strengthening these capabilities as the top priority for the newly appointed minister.

In this edition:

• Shahed Drones Are Evolving in Three Main Directions;

• Ground Drones Through an Operator’s Eyes: What Works—and What Breaks in War;

• Ukraine Collects Data for Its Interceptor Drones;

• 5+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

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Shahed Drones Evolve in Three Main Directions

Radio communications expert Serhiy FLASH Beskrestnov gave an exclusive interview to Fakty ICTV about how Russia is modifying Shahed drones, why they have become more dangerous, and how Chinese technologies are helping the enemy bypass electronic warfare.

He said that Shahed-type drones are currently evolving in three main directions.

First direction – improving the accuracy of Shahed drones and their strike precision.

Shaheds previously flew according to pre-programmed coordinates. An operator or pilot in Russia enters the coordinates in advance, and the drone follows them. All circling, altitude changes (descent or climb) occur automatically based on a preloaded flight program.

Shahed guidance relies on satellite navigation. If satellite navigation is unavailable, the Shahed cannot orient itself, locate a target, or strike it. Contrary to many rumors, the Shahed does not simply fall straight down like a stone. Instead, it continues flying using its inertial and internal navigation systems while searching for satellite navigation signals.

If the signal does not reappear, the drone eventually runs out of fuel, fails to find a target, and crashes. If the signal is restored, the Shahed corrects its course, returns to the target area, reacquires the target, and strikes it.

To counter this system, Ukraine deploys EW across its territory. The denser Ukraine’s EW coverage becomes, the more Russians enhance satellite navigation protection systems on Shaheds.

Early Shaheds were equipped with the Russian “Kometa” antenna, a four-element system capable of countering four EW sources. As Ukraine increased EW density, Russia upgraded to an eight-element antenna, requiring eight EW sources from different directions to suppress it.

They later introduced a 12-element antenna, requiring twelve EW sources. Russia did not stop there: they began installing Chinese antennas with 16 elements. “In some captured Shaheds, we have even documented antennas with 32 elements,” said Serhiy.

Weight is not a critical issue for Shahed drones. They can easily carry an additional 10–20–30 kg without major performance loss. An antenna weighing around 3 kg does not significantly affect flight range. Fuel reserves and engine power allow for these upgrades.

Second direction – increasing the warhead size and experimenting with payloads. “We have already seen thermite and cluster warheads. Recently, dual warheads have become common—two 50 kg charges, totaling 100 kg”.

Third direction – modifying Shahed drones to carry secondary weapons or additional equipment. Experts have observed cluster dispensers releasing PTM-3 anti-tank mines. The Shahed flies over an area and drops these mines from under its wings.

Not everyone realizes how critical Ukraine’s military aviation is in countering Shaheds. “This is an enormous effort carried out every night by our pilots, who risk their lives. Helicopters operate in fog; visibility is severely limited. Pilots cannot know the Shahed’s exact position down to the meter,” commented Serhiy.

Russia is developing systems to hunt helicopters. Recently, Shaheds equipped with rear-facing lights designed to blind Ukrainian interceptor drones were detected. A wide range of external payloads has been seen—various release mechanisms and experimental equipment. Russia continues searching for additional uses of Shahed drones during flight.

Why do Shaheds or Gerberas fly in circles? Previously, this was assumed to be a malfunction, a software error, or the effect of Ukrainian EW. Now, experts understand that these Shaheds, or Gerberas, act as signal relays.

Their task is to penetrate Ukrainian airspace, climb to altitude, and loiter in circular patterns, creating a radio signal for subsequent Shaheds deeper behind them. Serhiy mentioned, “When analyzing nightly air attacks, we consistently observe these Shahed relay drones. This is extremely dangerous.”

Shaheds are also being adapted for reconnaissance. Chinese video cameras are being installed on both Gerberas and Shaheds. According to the expert, almost all of these technologies are sourced from China.

In addition to ground surveillance, cameras are now being mounted upward, allowing the drones to observe the sky. Why? To look for Ukrainian interceptor drones.

Russia is actively searching for “corridors” for Shahed penetration. The first threat is air defense systems, the second is electronic warfare, and the third is interceptor drones. They try to bypass all of these.

Now, interceptor drones account for up to 20% of Shahed shoot-downs. Russia, therefore, seeks corridors without interceptor coverage. A logical approach is to send a cheap Gerbera first. If it flies through with a camera, then a second one follows and detects no interceptor drones in the sky, those corridors can subsequently be used to send Shaheds.

In his most recent Facebook post, FLASH wrote that, for Ukraine, it is appropriate to build layered defenses along the borders to prevent Shaheds from penetrating deep into the country. To do this, three things are required:

1. Establish a dense, unified radar coverage along all borders.

2. Ensure a high concentration and density of air-defence crews along the borders, including interceptor drones (and not only drones).

3. Make all of this operate effectively and in a coordinated manner—which requires a clear system for target allocation.

“Will this be a victory? No. As soon as this is achieved, Russia will immediately shift to jet-powered UAVs of the Geran-5 type. If we want to secure victory in this aerial war, we must already be developing solutions against Shahed-type drones capable of speeds of 500+ km/h,” writes FLASH.

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Ground Drones Through an Operator’s Eyes: What Works—and What Breaks in War

A summary of the conversation with the commander of an Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) platoon from the 190th Training Center about operator training, battlefield use, and the challenges UGVs face on the frontline.

Check the list of my articles and sections on ground drones here.

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