leadership aspirations in drone warfare and a new naval strategy

A long read summarizing major developments in Russia’s defense production, cooperation, and innovations throughout July. The doubling of gunpowder production, efforts to educate schoolchildren about drones, and an expanding missile arsenal that Russia is reportedly stockpiling—if this doesn’t convince you that Russia is preparing for a broader conflict, I don’t know what will.

Cooperation with North Korea continues to deepen, posing additional challenges for the Indo-Pacific region. Meanwhile, sanctions evasion persists.

It seems the allied West is still not doing enough.

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Military Cooperation and Alliances

On July 1, the Head of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR), Budanov, said that Russia had transferred the first batch of its Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile systems to North Korea and provided North Korea with equipment and technology for producing Shahed-type attack drones. According to Budanov, Moscow has been supplying not just equipment, but also technical expertise and manufacturing capabilities—rather than transferring complete Shahed drones. This move could further destabilize the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Budanov also reported that Russian specialists are currently training North Korean forces to use the systems, which are already deployed for the defense of Pyongyang. North Korean troops are expected to begin operating the systems independently shortly. Available information indicates that North Korean workers are undergoing training at Russian enterprises, including a drone plant in the “Alabuga” Special Economic Zone (Tatarstan), where modified “Shahed” drones are assembled.

According to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia is providing North Korea with a wide range of modern weaponry, including:

• tanks, artillery systems, and drones;

• missiles (in particular, air defense missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles);

• MiG-29 and Su-27 aircraft, Mi-8 helicopters;

• air defense systems.

In the technological sphere, Russia is granting North Korea access to microelectronics, missile technologies, gas turbines, and equipment for coal gasification. Additionally, RF supplies Pyongyang with fuel: gasoline and diesel.

Ukrainian officials assessed that North Korea had additionally deployed 20,000 to 30,000 troops to Russia.

During a visit to North Korea, Russian FM Lavrov warned the U.S., South Korea, and Japan against forming a security alliance aimed at countering Pyongyang.

Read more about Russia’s cooperation with North Korea here and here.

Additional developments:

• Since 2022, Belarusian state-owned companies—especially electronics manufacturers—have played a key role in supporting Russia’s war effort by supplying critical components like microchips and capacitors, helping Moscow offset Western sanctions through import substitution. Among Belarusian electronics manufacturers, Minsk-based “Integral” JSC is the key supplier of components to Russian military factories. Its microchips enable the production of critical systems like altimeters for Kh‑101 cruise missiles—one of which struck the “Ohmatdyt” children’s hospital, killing two and injuring sixteen. Integral’s role directly links Belarus to deadly attacks on civilians and infrastructure across Ukraine.

• In December 2024, an Indian company exported $1.4 million worth of HMX (octogen)—a high explosive with military applications—to Russia, according to Indian customs data reviewed by Reuters. One recipient was the Russian firm Promsintez, reportedly linked to Moscow’s military, according to Ukraine’s SBU security service. This shipment occurred despite U.S. warnings of sanctions against entities aiding Russia’s war effort. The Indian company Ideal Detonators Private Limited stated that it complies with all national regulations, and the shipment was made exclusively for civilian-industrial use, not for military purposes.

• Russia again postponed the delivery of the fourth and fifth squadrons of the S-400 systems to India. This is already the second deadline postponement, as the delivery of the last two batteries of the system was supposed to be completed before April 2023.

• Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) claimed that Russia was intensifying its military presence at Armenia’s Gyumri base to exert greater influence in the South Caucasus. The news came amid a major deterioration in Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Armenia denied that.

• Russia launched the first phase of a plant in Venezuela to produce 7.62 mm ammunition for Kalashnikov rifles. The facility will manufacture up to 70 million cartridges annually, according to the Russian state corporation Rostec. The agreement was reached in 2006 by Presidents Putin and Chávez. The project was launched in 2009.

• Russia became the first country to formally recognise the Taliban government in Afghanistan.

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Defense Production and Innovations

Gunpowder production in Russia nearly doubled from 2022 to 2024 due to increased imports and domestic manufacturing of cotton cellulose nitrate. This rise suggests a potential doubling in artillery shell output during the same period.

While imports amounted to 1,400 tons in 2019, by 2023 they had more than doubled to 3,000 tons. At the same time, domestic production also grew: between 2016 and 2021, Russia produced an average of 6,500 tons annually, which rose to 11,580 tons in 2023. Altogether, this amounts to 14,600 tons of nitrocellulose, which can yield up to 7,300 tons of pyroxylin gunpowder. For comparison, production volumes in Russia in 2014 were only 1,400 tons.

Russia continues to rely on imported raw materials—especially cotton pulp and cellulose nitrate. There is no significant domestic cotton cultivation in Russia, and most cotton lint, cotton pulp, and cotton cellulose nitrate have recently been imported from Uzbekistan, India, Malaysia, and Türkiye.

The workforce in key defense chemical enterprises increased from 23,600 employees in 2021 to 27,700 in 2024, marking a 17% growth.

Alongside this, thanks to the modernization of production capacities, overall manufacturing efficiency rose by 70%.

These figures demonstrate Russia’s focused expansion of its industrial capabilities to supply its armed forces with large quantities of ammunition.

Additional developments:

• Russian Su-35 fighter jets have begun using the new K-77M long-range air-to-air missile. The K-77M (also known as “Izdeliye 180”) was developed by the JSC “State Design Bureau ‘Vympel’, named after II Toropov, part of the Tactical Missiles Company. It is an upgraded version of the R-77-1 medium-range missile. Unlike the R-77-1, which uses lattice fins, the K-77M features conventional aerodynamic control surfaces and redesigned stabilizers, likely to allow internal carriage aboard the Su-57 fighter. The missile is reportedly powered by a dual-pulse solid-fuel motor, increasing its nominal maximum range from 110 km (R-77-1) to 190 km.

• Russia continues to expand its production of Shahed-type drones in order to launch even larger long-range drone strike packages that include up to 2,000 drones in a single night. Russian forces may be able to strike Ukraine with up to 2,000 drones in a single night by November 2025 should the current pattern of growth in nightly Russian drone usage continue – ISW. Russia’s use of one-way attack drones in nightly strike packages grew at an average monthly rate of 31 percent in both June and July 2025.

Sanctions Evasion

A Spanish company has circumvented international sanctions to deliver a 110-ton forging machine to Russia, which could potentially be used in the production of artillery barrels.

According to the investigation by The Insider, the Spanish firm Forward Technical Trade SL supplied a used CNC forging machine—manufactured by the Austrian company GFE (Gesellschaft für Fertigungstechnik und Entwicklung Schmalkalden e.V.)—to the Russian company AZK Group.

The production of artillery barrels in Russia entirely depends on such equipment. Howitzers’ barrels often wear out and need replacement. They can only be forged with the required precision on machines that Russia is currently unable to manufacture itself.

Austrian GFM forging machines for artillery barrel production have been used by the USSR and Russia since the 1970s.

Without radial forging machines, Russian artillery would soon run out of new barrels, and since Soviet-era reserves are limited, this would create significant problems on the front lines.

Russia and the West

Is Russia Outpacing NATO in Weapons Production? RFE/RL and the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), an open-source intelligence group, recently analyzed Russian and Western weapons production to determine whether Russia truly holds a significant production edge over the U.S. and its allies. Their analysis covered artillery, ammunition, tanks, aircraft, missiles, drones, and air defense systems.

Artillery Shells

Currently, U.S. production stands at about 40,000 shells per month—roughly 480,000 annually—bringing the combined U.S. and EU output to about 1.7 million shells per year.
CIT estimates that Russia’s expanded production facilities in Biysk, Kazan, and elsewhere could generate up to 4 million 152mm and 122mm shells per year.

Analyses by the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service and consulting firm Bain & Company for Sky News both estimated Russia’s total artillery shell output for 2024 at approximately 4.5 million rounds.

Russia predominantly produces 122mm and 152mm artillery shells, while the NATO-standard shell has a slightly bigger diameter of 155mm, and is mainly used in the Western Howitzer systems, such as those provided by allies to Kyiv.

Artillery Systems
Russia continues to rely heavily on its vast Soviet-era artillery stockpile. Reserves of towed howitzers have reportedly declined from about 12,000 in 2022 to just over 6,000 by mid-2024. Meanwhile, Russia is estimated to produce fewer than 100 modern self-propelled howitzers annually, including the Msta-S, Giatsint-K, and Malva.
In contrast, NATO countries are increasing production: France plans to manufacture 144 CAESAR systems in 2025, Poland is doubling the output of its AHS Krab to 100 per year, Slovakia is set to produce 40 Zuzana howitzers, and the U.S. builds 216 cannon tubes for its M777 howitzers each year.

Tanks
Russia appears to have the advantage in tank production, having resumed full-scale production of its modern T-90M, with an output of around 280 tanks per year.
Tank production in most European countries is limited. France hasn’t produced a Leclerc tank in over a decade, while the UK has ordered just 148 Challenger 3 tanks for delivery by 2030. Germany produces about 50 Leopard 2A8 tanks annually, and the U.S. manufactures 109 M1A2 Abrams tanks per year.

Combat Aircraft
Here, NATO holds a clear lead. Russia is estimated to produce 50–60 combat aircraft annually, including Su-57 fighters and Tu-160M2 strategic bombers.
Meanwhile, the U.S. alone is set to deliver more than 170 F-35 fighter jets this year. Additional production comes from European partners: France (Rafale), Sweden (Gripen), and others contributing dozens of more advanced jets annually.

Air Defense
As of 2024, Russia operated 248 S-400 batteries and added another 18 in 2025—implying a production rate of around 36 systems per year. Data on other systems like the Tor, Buk, and Pantsir is less transparent.
On NATO’s side, Raytheon produces around 12 Patriot systems per year. Germany’s Diehl plans to produce 8 IRIS-T systems in 2025 and between 800–1,000 associated missiles. NATO also fields the NASAMS system, which uses U.S.-made AIM-120 and AIM-9X missiles—produced at an annual rate of 1,200 and 2,500 units, respectively.

Drones and Cruise Missiles
Ukraine estimates Russia produces around 5,000 long-range drones per month—roughly 60,000 per year. These include the Geran-2 (a variant of Iran’s Shahed) and the Gerbera, a decoy drone without a warhead used to overload air defenses.
NATO does not currently produce equivalents to these low-cost kamikaze drones. The U.S. primarily fields more sophisticated and expensive systems like the Reaper and Global Hawk UAVs.
Russia also manufactures an estimated 200+ cruise and ballistic missiles per month, according to Ukraine’s military intelligence, amounting to 2,400–3,000 missiles annually. By comparison, the U.S. produces around 700 JASSM cruise missiles and 500 ATACMS ballistic missiles per year.
In this category, Russia holds the advantage in both kamikaze drone output and missile volume.

In his article, Russia is Preparing for the Next Missile War — Are We?, Fabian Hoffmann wrote that Russia does not appear to be using its full missile arsenal in Ukraine. Many newly produced missiles have been stockpiled rather than deployed, even during the winter months when attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure were expected.

This suggests a broader objective: Russia is likely reserving these weapons for future contingencies, including a potential confrontation with NATO.

Publicly available Russian military strategy emphasizes a short, intense campaign designed to compel NATO to capitulate quickly. Missile strikes would be central—beginning with limited salvos and escalating rapidly to signal that continued resistance would only lead to greater destruction.

Additional developments:

• Russia said European commercial satellites supporting Ukraine are legitimate targets for signal jamming. In March, eight European countries filed a complaint with the U.N. over Russia’s interference with the continent’s satellite communications. Seventeen other EU countries and the U.K. expressed support for the initiative, which urges Russia to stop its alleged sabotage.

• Russia will „firmly defend“ its interests in the Baltic region, Kremlin spokesperson Peskov said on July 14, responding to Estonia’s recent test of HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems over the Baltic Sea.

• Recent satellite images revealed that Russia has begun building a garrison for an artillery brigade in the Murmansk region near the border with Finland. This construction is the first concrete sign of a lasting troop presence in the area. Local authorities in Murmansk state that a new military town is being built about 150 kilometres from the border, with renovations underway on existing housing.

Russian Drones

The Russian government launched an extensive, multi-tiered initiative aimed at rapidly advancing the country’s drone development and production, with aspirations of becoming a global leader in the field. This plan combines significant federal and regional funding, support for thousands of startups, and even the structured training of schoolchildren in drone technologies.

As of March, Russian state media outlet TASS reported that nearly 900 companies were engaged in drone manufacturing, with about 70% classified as small or medium-sized enterprises. These businesses collectively employ more than 7,000 workers.

Between 2022 and 2025, Russia earmarked 243 billion rubles (roughly $3 billion) specifically for drone development. An additional 112 billion rubles (approximately $1.38 billion) have been set aside in the latest three-year federal budget. This funding is separate from military expenditures, which already account for nearly one-third of the national budget.

While Moscow officially emphasizes non-military goals for its drone program—often citing civilian or commercial uses—the dual-use nature of drone technology makes the boundary between peaceful and military applications inherently unclear. In 2023, Defense News reported that a Russian company, Integrated Robotics Technologies, publicly marketed itself as a manufacturer of agricultural and industrial drones while secretly promoting explosive, single-use drones. The company has not yet been subjected to international sanctions.

A notable feature of the Kremlin’s strategy is its geographic diversification. The 2025–2027 federal budget includes 21 billion rubles (around $260 million) to support eleven regional hubs dedicated to UAV research and production. Many of these facilities are located within existing economic zones, tech parks, or near legacy industrial and research centers—spanning from the St. Petersburg Technopark to Tomsk in Siberia.

Russian media and government statements present this geographic dispersion as part of a broader concept known to analysts as “strategic depth.” The idea is that scattering drone production capabilities across the country makes it more difficult for adversaries—such as Ukraine—to disrupt them with targeted strikes. Some of these facilities have already been attacked by Ukrainian drones.

Russian authorities have systematically involved children in the design and testing of drones for the war in Ukraine through nationwide competitions that begin with innocent-seeming video games and end up with the most talented students headhunted by defence companies, according to a recent investigation by The Insider. Russian authorities are actively cultivating a generation that is being taught not to distinguish between civilian and military uses of technology — and which may be prepared to take part in a war of aggression in exchange for a boost to exam scores or the offer of better career prospects.

ISW reported that Russia continues to use child and youth labor to produce drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan.

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Additional developments:

• Russia recently showcased its “Shturm” robotic assault system during a series of field tests. The platform was developed by Uralvagonzavod, the world’s largest producer of main battle tanks. Designed for remote deployment in hazardous environments—especially urban combat zones—the Shturm emphasizes minimizing personnel risk.

  Although the system is intended for remote operation, at least one unit was observed carrying a crew during testing, implying that its autonomous or remote functionality may still be under refinement.

• Ukrainian OSINT analyst Dnipro Osint (Garbuz) published a detailed report examining where Russia launches Iranian-designed Shahed drones from.

  Main Launch Sites:

  1. Orlov Region – Tsymbulovo Village (Main Hub)

     • ~175 km from the Ukrainian border.

     • Known as the main “droneport” (shown in Russian propaganda).

     • Features: 8 stationary launchers, 2.8 km launch road (vehicle-based), 15 bunkers.

     • Capacity: Up to 14 drones launched simultaneously, over 100 per strike.

     • Up to 3,000 warheads may be stored on-site.

     • One warehouse was destroyed previously with 3 SS missiles (~200 warheads destroyed).

  2. Bryansk Region – Navlya Village

     • ~70 km from the border.

     • Smaller than Orlov, built recently.

     • Features: 3 bunkers (~600 warheads), 3 garages.

     • Only mobile launches possible; no stationary launchers.

     • Can launch only a few drones at a time. May be expanded.

  3. Krasnodar Krai – Primorsko-Akhtarsk

     • ~230 km from the frontline.

     • Tactical airbase with 3 designated Shahed launch zones.

     • 8 stationary launchers + launches from airstrip via vehicles.

     • Capacity: 10 simultaneous, ~25 drones per strike.

     • Protected by an S-400 battery (6 launchers, 2 radars).

  Other Launch Directions:

  • Additional (less-known) launch points exist in Crimea and Eastern Russia, though harder to track.

  • The Orlov base remains the primary hub.

  • A full-scale disruption of Orlov would require dozens of Storm Shadow missiles and coordinated drone attacks.

  Successful Ukrainian Strike Example – Yeysk

  • Target: 726th Air Defense Training Center.

  • Stored: ~20 Shaheds, 90+ recon drones in tented depot.

  • Result: 2 “Neptune” missiles destroyed buildings, injured 9, killed 1, depot wiped out.

  • Supply warehouse in nearby Oktyabrsky (35 km away) was also destroyed.

  • Outcome: No further Shahed launches from Yeysk since.

Russia’s Warfare Tactics

Russian forces may be testing an experimental version of the KAB guided glide bomb to extend its operational range. Ukrainian air defenses successfully intercepted a Russian Grom-1 hybrid missile-bomb near the outskirts of Dnipro City.

Ukrainian air defense official explained that Russia had previously equipped these bombs with jet engines to increase their reach and likely used a lighter warhead on the bomb targeting Dnipro to reduce weight and thus further boost range. It was also suggested that the bomb was launched from an aircraft as close to Dnipro as possible.

Ukrainian expert and a former engineer at the Pivdenne Design Office, Kochetkov, said that the Grom-1 was developed to improve the range and precision of KAB guided bombs while reducing risk to Russian aircraft.

He described the Grom-1 as a hybrid between a glide bomb and the Kh-38 air-to-air missile, utilizing the Kh-38’s propulsion system, which enables a range of approximately 100 to 150 kilometers. Kochetkov also noted that the Grom-1 may have been deployed for the first time in August 2024 during a strike on Kostyantynivka in Donetsk Oblast, but Russia has yet to begin mass production of this missile-bomb.

Russia: Naval Affairs

On July 25, Patrushev, Assistant to the President of Russia, Chairman of the Russian Maritime Board, announced that in the coming years, the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) will be strengthened, including through the introduction of new marine robotic systems. Patrushev noted that the Black Sea Fleet successfully resists the growing opposition of NATO in the region and plays an important role in the special military operation.

A day earlier, Putin said that Russia would ensure its security in all areas of the world’s oceans. He also expressed his intention to fully implement the planned plans for the creation of a modern Russian Navy. “There are more than 70 ships at various stages of construction at Russian shipyards. For example, at Sevmash alone, six new nuclear submarines are planned to be built by 2030,” – Putin added.

Ukraine claims it has sunk or disabled a third of all Russian warships in the Black Sea. Beginning with the April 2022 sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Moskva, Ukraine used a combination of domestically produced drones and missiles together with Western-supplied long-range weapons to strike a series of devastating blows against Putin’s fleet. Cruise missiles delivered by Kyiv’s British and French partners have played an important role in this campaign, but the most potent weapons of all have been Ukraine’s own rapidly evolving fleet of innovative marine drones, such as Magura and SeaBaby.

In the most recent edition of the Drone Warfare in Ukraine, I reported that Russia is increasingly investing in naval drone production. In mid-July, Russia opened a unified center for the production of maritime drones based at the defense-industrial enterprise Kingisepp Machine-Building Plant in Saint Petersburg. The shipbuilding enterprise, which specializes in the production of marine propulsion systems and boats, plans to manufacture several dozen maritime drones for civilian purposes.

On May 30, Putin approved a naval strategy through 2050. Among other points, it highlights a significantly increased role for unmanned systems—primarily uncrewed surface vessels, underwater drones, and, in the future, fully autonomous ships.

Additional developments:

• Russian authorities cancelled a major annual navy parade planned for July 26 for “security reasons”, without specifying the threat or concern.

• Russia conducted large-scale naval exercises dubbed “July Storm” on July 23-27, involving over 150 ships and 15,000 personnel across the Pacific and Arctic oceans, as well as the Baltic and Caspian seas.

  During the „July Storm“ exercises, the Russian Navy showcased a new unmanned naval vehicle. According to Russian claims, the drone can be launched from a ship, operate autonomously for up to 24 hours, and strike naval targets at distances of over 300 kilometers.

• According to Forbes, Russia has effectively acknowledged that its only aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, is nearing the end of its service life and will likely be scrapped or sold. The decision follows years of costly maintenance and a failed 2016 deployment to Syria that highlighted the vessel’s chronic technical issues. Andrei Kostin, head of Russia’s state shipbuilding corporation, confirmed in July that repairing the 40-year-old ship is no longer viable due to its age and high costs.

• A powerful 8.8-magnitude earthquake struck off the coast of Russia’s far eastern Kamchatka Peninsula early on July 30, generating tsunami waves across the Pacific. The epicenter was located just about 75 miles from a strategic concentration of Russian naval bases, including facilities that house nuclear ballistic missile submarines. The proximity of the quake has raised questions about potential damage to these military installations.

  While modern submarines are built to withstand underwater pressure and shocks, land-based infrastructure, including missile storage depots, docking systems, and nuclear maintenance facilities, is far more susceptible to seismic damage. If any part of the command-and-control systems were compromised, the consequences could be severe — not just for Russia, but for global nuclear stability. The fact that one of the world’s most dangerous nuclear stockpiles sits atop one of the world’s most active seismic zones is a strategic paradox that demands international attention.