long-range strikes and naval drone export

In recent months, Ukraine has reportedly struck 16 of Russia’s 38 refineries, with the longest reported strike reaching 1,800 km. Kyiv has also unveiled new drones said to have a reach of up to 2,100 km. While a number of countries would like to purchase Ukraine’s long-range strike technologies, those systems are unlikely to be intended for the newly opened military export.

Naval drones, by contrast, are already being prepared for export. Ukraine fields several families of unmanned naval vehicles — both surface and underwater — and below I provide a brief description of each.

In this edition:

• Ukraine’s long-range drones hit Russia’s oil network;

• Naval drone export: what Ukraine can offer;

• Russia’s massed strikes: the strategy of coercion by salvo (summary of the report);

• Additional key developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

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Ukraine’s Long-Range Drones Hit Russia’s Oil Network

Since early August, 16 of Russia’s 38 refineries have been hit, some repeatedly, including the Ryazan plant near Moscow, one of the country’s largest fuel-processing facilities with a capacity of 340,000 barrels per day. Historically, oil refineries are concentrated in Central Russia.

The strikes have disrupted more than 1 million barrels a day of Russia’s refining capacity.

Russia is the third-largest producer of oil worldwide, accounting for over 12% of global crude oil production. The Russian oil and gas sector contributes about 20% of the country’s GDP on average.

Repeated long-range drone strikes on refineries, terminals, and logistics nodes have cut Russian refining capacity in some periods by up to a fifth.

Damage to ports and coastal terminals (examples reported: Ust-Luga, Primorsk) constrains seaborne shipments, storage, and loading, and therefore export logistics.

I addressed many of these points in the recent geopolitics podcast Behind the Lines, hosted by

, an Associate Fellow at RUSI and former UK diplomat (check his Substack). You can listen to the episode on Spotify or Apple Podcasts.

• Ukraine views the sector as a legitimate military target, both for its role in providing the energy products to fuel Russian forces’ tanks, aircraft and drones and the revenue it generates to pay for the war.

• “Ukraine will not stop drone attacks on military targets in Russia until Moscow agrees to peace,” Ukraine’s officials stated.

• Some of the drones used in these attacks include the Liytyi and the FP-1.

• Liutyi was developed to strike targets deep inside Russia at a time when Ukraine was not permitted to use weapons that the United States had supplied across the border. That is why the UAV is called a “Tomahawk for the poor”: a smaller, slower, cheaper, and less powerful version of weapons like the Tomahawk cruise missiles used by U.S. forces.

• Liutyi (AN-196) — described publicly as a long-range attack drone used for deep strikes. It is a unique analogue of the Iranian Shahed. It has high resistance to jamming and can vary its altitude during flight depending on the terrain.

• Liutyi has the following characteristics: hybrid guidance (inertial navigation plus satellite communications); reported payload figures vary (~75 kg or higher in some claims), and ranges have been reported in the order of 1,000+ km, with some sources citing extended ranges up to ~2,000 km.

• Each unit is estimated to cost around $200,000—significantly more than the Russian Shahed (around $50,000) but substantially less than a cruise missile.

• The inertial navigation system ensures full autonomy on the flightpath, while satellite communication makes it possible for the operator to change the trajectory at any moment for maximum precision. Satellite communication is not always available due to interference or jamming by Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems, but, when the opportunity presents itself, the operator can take control to complete the mission with maximum results.

• Liutyi is assembled, armed, programmed, and takes off like an airplane from a stretch of road or an airstrip, while the team of fighters disperses before the Russians can strike the launch site. Launches are coordinated so that several Liutyi drones simultaneously enter Russian airspace alongside other types, some of which are decoys fitted with radar reflectors. Read my previous report on the Liutyi drone here.

• FP-1 long-range drone — publicly unveiled and reported to be manufactured at scale: production rates have been compared to Shahed-class loitering munitions (estimates ~100 units/day), with an estimated unit cost around $55,000. Reports attribute ~60% of deep strikes to FP-1-type platforms.

• These drones use simple, low-cost construction to keep unit cost and build time low while enabling mass production. Read more about the long-range kamikaze FP-1 drone here.

• Generally speaking, the production scale of long-range drones in Ukraine remains a constraint: estimates suggest Russia can produce Shahed variants in much larger volumes (approximately 70,000/year), so Ukraine’s effort is impactful but not necessarily volume-equal to Russian output.

• Design trade-offs are central: a longer range requires more fuel, which reduces space for the explosive payload. “Drones that fly far are forced to allocate a large portion of their weight and space to fuel/batteries, which leaves less room for explosives. A longer flight range also creates aerodynamic challenges – to carry more fuel, drones have to be larger, which makes them heavier, slower, and easier to intercept,” experts note.

• The result is drones optimized for reach and cost rather than maximum blast effect, so individual strikes often cause less structural damage than larger missiles but cause cumulative degradation of refinery throughput and logistics.

• Ukraine’s long-range attacks rely heavily on a mix of attack drones and decoys/swarm tactics to complicate defences and increase mission success rates.

• Reported typical mission mix includes strike vehicles plus decoys/diversionary drones; one reported sortie involved 100 drones entering Russian territory with ~30% tasked as diversionary, flying ranges of ~280–340 km.

• Drone teams in Ukraine synchronize launches so multiple systems (strike drones, loitering munitions, and decoys) enter defended airspace together to overwhelm or deceive Russia’s air defences.

• Mission success is assessed through three main, non-operational channels: ground reconnaissance, monitoring local reports (including open Telegram groups), and follow-up satellite imagery analysis.

• In September 2025, the United Kingdom announced the decision to finance thousands of long-range, one-way attack drones for Ukraine as part of its military aid. The drones will be manufactured in the United Kingdom and delivered to Ukraine within the next 12 months.

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Naval Drone Export: What Ukraine Can Offer

Last week, President Zelensky announced that Ukraine is ready to begin controlled exports of surplus military goods, including naval drones. Around the same time, reports appeared that Ukraine is launching serial production of its unmanned underwater vehicles.