A Window of Opportunity for Ukraine–Colombia Security Cooperation

On August 7, Abelardo de la Espriella was inaugurated as President of Colombia. During his election campaign, he promised to bring peace to Colombian society, which continues to be affected by hundreds of armed groups.

Given the new government’s political orientation toward the US and the broader Western world, the coming four years present a window of opportunity to revive cooperation between Colombia and Ukraine. I spoke with a Ukrainian drone pilot, defence industry representatives, and Colombian thought leaders and realized that such cooperation would be mutually beneficial. Ukraine could gain a strong ally in South America, while Colombian authorities could strengthen their capabilities to counter domestic security threats.

Why are guerrilla groups so difficult to counter? Because they retain the initiative and choose when and where to attack. Ukraine could contribute to developing a solution to counter armed groups in Colombia: from shaping the overall strategy and developing practical solutions, such as identifying the commercial sources of drones and building electronic warfare systems, to planning offensive actions aimed at regaining the initiative.

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A week before this major political transition, I was in Bogotá for a conference organized by the Naval Academy of Strategic Studies and attended by personnel from the Colombian Navy and Army. I delivered a 40-minute presentation on drone and counter-drone innovations in Ukraine.

In Colombia, drones are not a novel technology. For over a decade, they have been used by paramilitary and drug-trafficking groups for a variety of illicit purposes, including reconnaissance, delivery, and attacks against government forces. Although the Colombian government pursued several projects in drone and anti-drone warfare, they demonstrated limited effectiveness. In this context, closer cooperation with Ukraine would help Colombia keep pace with emerging threats.

Through private conversations, I learned that there had been several attempts to establish cooperation on these issues, but due to political challenges in recent years, they did not materialize. I believe this is about to change.

Colombia–Ukraine Relations and the Russia Factor

Bilateral relations between Ukraine and Colombia have been underprioritized for years. The first communication between the presidents of the two states took place in April 2022, after Russia’s full-scale invasion. In the first months of the full-scale invasion, Colombia voted in support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity at the UN General Assembly. In the following years, however, it mostly abstained from voting on relevant resolutions.

Ukraine does not currently have a resident diplomatic mission in Colombia; bilateral relations are overseen by the Ukrainian Embassy in Peru.

Russia, on the other hand, has long maintained a strong presence in the country, allowing it to spread its narratives and build influence. Prof. Carlos Patiño from the National University of Colombia informed me that Russia has operated — and continues to operate — a structured intelligence network in Colombia since 2017.

Despite the official congratulations on de la Espriella’s victory, Russia’s frustration with the election outcome is already evident in the coverage of several pro-government information channels. The Telegram channel Rybar, for example, has been criticizing his counterterrorism agenda daily and apparently no longer includes Colombia on the list of friendly countries.

This is a good sign.

There are very few international organizations in Colombia actively trying to counter Russia’s influence. One of them is the German Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. The director of its Colombia office, Dr. Kristin Wesemann, told me that one of the Foundation’s goals is to support democratic institutions, security, and innovation-driven economies around the world. In Colombia, the Foundation works to counter disinformation and Russian narratives. It also raises awareness of developments in Ukraine and Europe and organizes workshops with military personnel, police, and politicians to strengthen understanding of Russian propaganda and influence operations.

In the context of drone warfare, Russia has already been advancing multiple disinformation narratives, claiming that Ukraine allows cartels and paramilitary groups to gain drone warfare experience or is even supplying drones to South America. These claims have been repeatedly refuted, but they can still resonate with unprepared audiences.

European intelligence agencies have also warned that Russia has been collecting captured Ukrainian drones for potential use in staged provocations in third countries. It would therefore not be surprising to see Russia attempt a similar tactic in Latin America, potentially using captured Ukrainian drones to manufacture evidence supporting its disinformation narratives.

Colombians in the Russia–Ukraine War

Currently, around 16,000 foreigners are serving in Ukraine’s armed forces, with citizens of Latin American countries comprising about 40% of that number. Some sources estimate that around 7,000 Colombians have fought in Ukraine, where they have been praised for their strong preparation and resilience on the battlefield. For instance, in July, an assault group of Colombian volunteers fighting in the Ukrainian Armed Forces eliminated Russian troops on a section of the front between Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhzhia region.

Under international law, foreign soldiers in Ukraine are not mercenaries but members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; they have the right to prisoner-of-war status and are protected by the Geneva Conventions.

Ukrainian authorities say they attempt to check the profiles of all foreign combatants applying to join the Armed Forces and even reject some. At the same time, we can understand that amid the massive manpower needs on the battlefield, Ukraine has limited resources to verify the backgrounds of every foreign volunteer.

In private conversations in Colombia, I was told that over the previous four years, there had been little interest among Colombian authorities in working with Ukraine to address this problem.

With Ukraine planning to expand foreign recruitment in the near future, this could become a more serious issue. The Executive Director of the Institute of Political Science, based in Bogotá, Carlos Augusto Chacón, believes that it’s important for Colombia and Ukraine to exchange information on criminal recruiters and intermediaries, strengthen vetting of foreign recruits, investigate attempts to divert military knowledge or components, and establish robust end-use controls. “Any investigation of Colombian returnees must be based on individualised evidence and conducted under judicial oversight, without treating all veterans or volunteers as security risks,” Carlos added.

Currently, Ukraine is building a system in which foreign recruits will be vetted and sign contracts directly with military units. Since the government plans to involve private recruitment companies and pay them for each candidate who joins the military, Ukraine will also need to check the people who identify and bring them into the recruitment system. The government should know every local agent used by a recruitment company. Before departure, candidates should receive information about their contracts, pay, and future service directly from a government-authorized centre. “When a company recruits people abroad through several intermediaries, the government should be able to see the entire chain. Otherwise, Ukraine may thoroughly check someone once they reach the country while knowing very little about how — or on what terms — they were brought there,” wrote Ihor Bezkaravaynyi, Deputy Minister of Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine.

The actual number of foreign nationals fighting for Russia remains unknown. As of March 30, Ukraine had identified 27,407 foreign nationals serving with Russian forces from at least 135 countries.

The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), together with two other organizations, has analyzed Russia’s recruitment of foreigners. Cuba and Colombia have been identified as the main recruitment hotspots in the region.

In early August 2026, Colombian news channel Noticias Caracol published an investigation based on testimonies from the families of missing soldiers, describing how Russia is recruiting Colombian citizens and using them as cannon fodder in its war of aggression against Ukraine.

Russia recruits Colombians for several reasons. First, Colombia has a large number of people with military and paramilitary experience as a result of the country’s long-running armed conflict. The second reason is economic, as financial incentives can make such recruitment attractive to vulnerable individuals. A third factor is that the Colombian government has not yet taken strong measures to prevent or oppose these recruitment efforts.

The investigation also described the routes through which recruits are reportedly sent to Russia. From Colombia, recruits are first sent to Peru or Panama and then to Brazil. From there, they may travel through Morocco, India, or the UAE before eventually reaching Russia, using routes through countries that maintain relatively close relations with Moscow. While the Russian Embassy in Colombia stated that it was not involved in recruiting Colombian citizens, the Colombians featured in the investigation presented contracts signed with the Russian Ministry of Defence.

Looking at this issue in a broader context, it is important to understand that even if Colombian fighters were not cartel or paramilitary members at the time of recruitment, once they return home, they might become targets for violent groups seeking their knowledge and expertise and offering better economic opportunities.

The Use of Drones by Non-State Actors in Colombia

Violence in Colombia has lasted for decades. The modern armed conflict officially began in 1964 with the formation of two separate guerrilla groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Despite reconciliation processes, several groups that now use drones refused to demobilize following the 2016 peace agreement.

In 2025, illegal armed groups in Colombia expanded significantly and together numbered more than 27,000 members. Armed groups, which finance themselves through drug trafficking, illegal mining, and other crimes, remain active in Colombia after a six-decade conflict that has left more than 450,000 people dead.

The use of drones has risen sharply in recent years. Armed groups are using these systems mainly for two purposes: attacks and surveillance. They target specific infrastructure and attack police and the army, but another very common use is territorial control through surveillance flights.

One of the more effective tactics is to use drones for forward observation, identifying and adjusting targets before attacks with improvised explosive devices launched on indirect trajectories. Armed groups also use weaponized drones to drop 60 mm grenades vertically onto positions. Another method involves climbing to high altitude before approaching the target and releasing the payload, helping the drone reduce its exposure to some counter-UAS systems.

Colombia’s mountainous and heavily forested terrain provides armed groups with concealed areas from which they can prepare and launch drone-enabled attacks. In regions such as Catatumbo, Cauca, Nariño, and Urabá, security forces can find their movements disrupted by drones operated from hidden rear positions.

Armed groups in Colombia obtain drones through several channels, including consumer marketplaces such as Amazon and Temu, local intermediaries, and cross-border smuggling networks. Commercial systems are then adapted for operational or combat use.

Colombia’s MoD reported 8,395 weaponized drone attacks in 2025, 333 of which were “effective” in striking their targets. This represented a 445% increase over 2024, when 61 effective incidents were recorded. Overall, according to the Defence Ministry, 20 people were killed by drones in 2025, and 297 were injured.

The offensive use of armed UAVs in Latin America reached its most significant escalation on 21 August 2025, when an FPV drone “successfully” targeted a Colombian National Police helicopter, killing 12 police officers.

Since 2019, Colombia’s security forces have acquired at least nine counter-UAS systems from both domestic and international suppliers. So far, however, these investments have produced limited results. Illegal armed groups continue to adapt quickly, including by using platforms such as Autel drones with frequency-hopping capabilities that can bypass some systems currently in service. According to technical assessments, jammers may be only 30–50% effective even against relatively basic drones. Armed groups have already been reported using lower-frequency links that conventional jammers struggle to disrupt.

From their involvement in the Russia–Ukraine war, foreign volunteers are also learning how to bypass military jamming. Some are seeking drones controlled through fibre-optic cables, which allow operators to maintain a connection over long distances without relying on vulnerable radio links.

According to reports, Colombian armed groups are already beginning to use FPV drones but still lack some of the more advanced technical expertise seen in Ukraine, including “how to encrypt the communication between the drone and the person piloting it, or how to set up the explosive charge the way they do in Ukraine.”

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Window of Opportunity for Colombia and Ukraine

“The new administration of President Abelardo de la Espriella is likely to mark a decisive shift away from the negotiation-centred Total Peace policy. The new approach is expected to place greater emphasis on restoring state authority, protecting civilians, recovering territorial control, and dismantling the command, financial, logistical, and political-support networks of illegal armed groups,” says political scientist Carlos Augusto Chacón.

The new president is politically close to the United States and the Trump administration, which will certainly provide opportunities for American businesses to become more involved in Colombia. But there may also be room for Ukrainian innovations, particularly since the Colombian military and law-enforcement agencies recognize they need to learn from Ukraine.

In June 2026, President Zelensky expressed interest in strengthening bilateral relations with Colombia, while de la Espriella responded that his government would be open to expanding cooperation between the two countries.

But what specific technologies from Ukraine would actually be relevant for Colombia?

The threats the two countries face are different. Colombian authorities need to respond to highly adaptive and fast-moving actors with significant resources, rapid decision-making processes, and few constraints imposed by norms or regulations.

Ukrainian contact from one of the elite drone units told me that dealing with guerrillas equipped with drones is a particularly difficult task for any government. “The initiative will remain with guerrilla groups because they are likely to act first. Buildings are easy targets: a drone could be directed at the window of a politician while the operator is hundreds of kilometres away, in the jungle,” he told me.

Yet, we managed to identify several areas where Colombia could benefit from Ukraine’s experience.

Against criminal groups, detecting a drone is only part of the problem. Authorities should focus on identifying operators, training locations, assembly workshops, logistics networks, and procurement patterns before deploying drones.

“The only realistic option is to act proactively and target the sources of the threat before drones are deployed. That means identifying the workshops where drones are assembled, locating the pilots and training sites, and using intelligence to disrupt these networks. OSINT and human intelligence can play a major role here, but authorities should also pay attention to seemingly minor indicators: people talk, and information eventually emerges. Commercial activity can also reveal patterns. For example, pilot training inevitably involves crashes and broken components. If someone suddenly starts buying hundreds of propellers every month from radio or hobby stores, that should at least raise a question: why does this person need so many? These small signals, when combined, can help identify a threat before it materializes,” the Ukrainian drone operator told me.

BlueBird Tech, the producer of the Chuika drone detector, which is widely used in Ukraine, said that the most realistic approach for Colombia would be a multi-layered counter-drone system combining passive RF detectors, electro-optical cameras, tools for locating drone operators, and localized jamming capabilities. Such a system should be relatively affordable, energy-efficient, and suitable for deployment around military bases, prisons, critical infrastructure, border areas, and mobile convoys. Within this architecture, drone detectors could play a central role by providing early warning and situational awareness.

When dealing with criminal groups, it is often not enough simply to detect the drone itself. It may be equally important to identify the operator’s location and collect information that can later support intelligence or law-enforcement operations.

BlueBird Tech noted that for asymmetric conflicts, drone detectors need to be optimized differently from those for large-scale warfare. Under such conditions, key requirements include a low false-alarm rate, sustained autonomous 24/7 operation, discreet installation, and the ability to determine the operator’s direction or approximate location.

Particular attention should be paid to detecting activity on widely used commercial platforms and short bursts of communication, as criminal groups may operate a drone for only a few dozen seconds. At the same time, fully autonomous drones may have a very limited RF signature, making them difficult to detect with RF sensors alone. The most effective approach is therefore to combine radio-frequency, optical, and acoustic sensors.

Colombian political scientist Carlos Augusto Chacón believes that jamming alone will not be effective against every threat. The new government inherited an ongoing national counter-drone programme. Its priority should be to evaluate its effectiveness, ensure interoperability among the Armed Forces and Police, conduct realistic operational testing, and avoid fragmented or duplicative procurement.

The Ukrainian drone pilot agrees that jamming everything is not an option. “Police should have access to separate frequencies and dedicated channels that remain usable while jamming is active. One option is to deliberately leave several protected ‘gaps’ in the EW coverage for police communications, using frequencies that are not typical for commercially available systems. The broader principle is that law enforcement should have specialized communications technologies that criminal groups cannot easily replicate with civilian radios. Otherwise, you may disrupt the cartel’s drones and communications, but at the same time lose police communications”.

HIMERA, a Ukrainian producer of tactical radios that recently tested its communication system in the Amazon jungle, noted that the trials were conducted in difficult climatic and geographic conditions, including lowland jungle terrain and heavy tropical rainfall.

The company commented that modern hybrid warfare and efforts to counter transnational organized crime require tactical communications systems that ensure information security, withstand electromagnetic countermeasures, and maintain operational continuity in geographically challenging environments. Their experience in Ukraine has enabled HIMERA to develop a solution that maintains effective communication even in the most challenging conditions. The company believes that such technologies could also be useful for other countries operating in difficult terrain and confronting organized armed groups.

Ukrainian EW producer Kvertus told me that it currently has no specific projects in Colombia but sees significant potential for cooperation. Each country has its own specific operating environment; for this reason, any counter-drone solution has to be adapted to local conditions and the specific nature of the threat.

According to the company, any potential cooperation with Ukraine would need to begin with a request from the Colombian side. If Colombia identifies a need for Ukrainian expertise and technologies, the next step could be to launch a dialogue at the state and relevant government-agency levels to define specific requirements, possible formats of cooperation, and the procedures necessary to implement such projects.

The international intelligence community InformNapalm, which has conducted a series of successful OSINT, CYBINT, and HUMINT investigations and contributed to operations against Russian forces, told me that one of the key directions for the development of modern intelligence is the creation of an integrated ecosystem for situational awareness and intelligence fusion, capable of combining information from different intelligence disciplines and the widest possible range of relevant sensors.

This does not necessarily mean creating a single centralized database. More important is establishing an information environment in which data from different institutions can be securely shared, compared, and complemented. Such information may come from HUMINT, SIGINT, GEOINT, OSINT, CYBINT, financial intelligence, technical surveillance, and other relevant sources.

According to InformNapalm, the key challenge is moving from analysing isolated signals toward working with large volumes of accumulated data. Modern algorithms and AI systems can significantly scale analysts’ work by identifying hidden connections, recurring patterns of behaviour and movement, detecting anomalies, analysing changes over time, and helping to develop likely scenarios.

At the same time, the quantity of information should never substitute for its quality. In this model, AI should support analysts rather than replace human judgement or responsibility for final assessments.

InformNapalm sees two interconnected priorities in a complex security environment like one in Colombia:

• The first is expanding the number and diversity of relevant sensors where gaps in observation exist.

• The second, equally important, is improving the sharing, correlation, processing, and timely dissemination of information already available across different institutions. Even high-quality intelligence has limited value if it remains isolated within one agency or reaches decision-makers too late.

Conclusions

The most relevant areas of cooperation between Ukraine and Colombia are limiting violent non-state groups’ access to lessons from Ukraine’s battlefield and strengthening the capabilities of Colombian authorities to address emerging security threats.

In the age of drone warfare, it is important to prioritize the human component of unmanned operations. At least for now, around 80% of a drone mission’s success still depends on the crew. Violent non-state groups will attempt to train their personnel — if not in Ukraine, then in Russia. If that is not possible, they may seek to recruit Colombians and other South Americans returning from the war, or even Ukrainian or Russian soldiers who eventually retire and begin looking for better economic opportunities.

The international organization, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, published a report based on an analytical exercise conducted with Ukrainian drone pilots, concluding that organized crime’s use of drones is now multi-domain. The integration of drones and humans, and the convergence of physical and digital methods, produces a flexible and resilient criminal system that is increasingly difficult to counter with conventional law enforcement tools.

That is why strengthening cooperation channels between Ukraine and Colombia in this area is highly advisable, particularly as Colombia’s political climate is expected to become more favorable. The Colombian Police and Armed Forces are already eager to learn from Ukraine’s experience in drone and counter-drone operations. Strong cooperation channels between the militaries and law-enforcement agencies of both countries, including field visits and regular exchanges, would significantly support this effort. “Ukraine knows better than almost any other country how to train personnel for drone warfare. Ignoring this experience would be like shooting oneself in the foot—especially if drone warfare in the jungle is already on the horizon,” mentioned a Ukrainian drone operator.

When it comes to the actual protection of infrastructure, government facilities, and the lives of police and military personnel, Ukraine has worked with several countries, particularly in the Middle East, on establishing layered air defence systems tailored to their specific needs and operational requirements. A similar approach could be applied to Colombia, with Ukrainian experts helping develop a strategy to protect against and counter multiple threats posed by emerging technologies.

It also closely aligns with Ukraine’s broader priorities, including its ambition to become a global security provider, and could open doors to cooperation with other South American countries facing similar security challenges.

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Read my earlier reports:

Also, check out my list of articles on the theme of Air Defence and Counter-UAS.